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This study shows that an expectations-based optimal policy rule has desirable 
properties in a standard macroeconomic model incorporating a cost channel for 
monetary disturbances and inflation rate expectations that are partly backward-
looking. Specifically, optimal monetary policy under commitment is associated 
with a determinate REE that is stable under learning, whereas, under discretion, 
the central bank has to be sufficiently inflation averse for the equilibrium to have 
these properties. 
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Optimaalinen korko-ohjaus ja rahapolitiikan 
kustannuskanava osittain eteenpäin katsovassa 
dynaamisessa rahapolitiikan makromallissa 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 24/2007 
Mikael Bask 




Tässä tutkimuksessa osoitetaan, että ennustetietoon perustuvalla rahapolitiikan 
korkosäännöllä on talouden tasapainottumisen kannalta hyviä ominaisuuksia raha-
politiikan dynaamisessa makromallissa, jossa rahapolitiikan vaikutukset välittyvät 
yritysten tuotantokustannusten kautta ja jossa odotustenmuodostus on osittain 
menneeseen katsovaa. Työssä täsmällisemmin sanoen osoitetaan, että sitoutumi-
nen rahapolitiikassa – eli yksityisen sektorin odotusten yhdistäminen keskus-
pankin politiikkavalmisteluun – on tasapainon määräytyneisyyden ja odotusten-
muodostuksen pitkän aikavälin rationaalisuuden kannalta tärkeää. Toisaalta nämä 
tasapainon ominaisuudet – määräytyneisyys ja odotustenmuodostuksen harhatto-
muus – toteutuvat harkinnanvaraisen rahapolitiikan oloissa, jolloin keskuspankki 
ei ota huomioon politiikkatoimenpiteidensä odotusvaikutuksia, vain jos keskus-
pankki on riittävän inflaationvastainen. 
 
Avainsanat: sitoutuminen, määräytyneisyys, harkinnanvaraisuus, odotuksiin pe-
rustuva ohjaussääntö, pienimmän neliösumman oppiminen 
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To overcome the problem with the indeterminacy of REE that is a typical result
when an optimal policy rule for the central bank is implemented in a standard
macroeconomic model, Evans and Honkapohja (2003a—c, 2006) argue that the
interest rate rule should be implemented as an expectations-based rule. This is
b e c a u s es u c har u l ed o e sn o ti m p o s er a t i o n a le x p e c t a t i o n so nb e h a l fo fa g e n t s ,
but, instead, incorporate their private expectations into the rule. As a result,
there is a mechanism that can correct these expectations so that the economy
ends up in a REE that also is unique.
What we do in this paper is to examine if an expectations-based rule still
have desirable properties after extending a standard model in two directions.
The ﬁrst is to include a cost channel into the model since Barth and Ramey
(2001) and Chowdhury et al (2006) provide empirical evidence for such a
channel. That is, they found evidence that ﬁrms’ marginal costs are directly
aﬀected by the interest rate. The intuition is that ﬁr m sh a v et op a yt h e i r
production factors before they receive revenues from selling their products,
and, therefore, need to borrow money from ﬁnancial intermediaries.
Another empirical ﬁnding is that there is persistence in inﬂation rates (see
Altissimo et al, 2006, for references for the euro area). Thus, several authors
have found that the presence of the lagged inﬂation rate improves the ability
of empirical models to explain observed inﬂation rate dynamics. Therefore, a
hybrid new Keynesian model is sometimes used as the theoretical framework in
policy-making, meaning that the expected inﬂation rate is a weighted average
of the lagged inﬂation rate and the inﬂation rate under rational expectations.
In this paper, we do the same extension in a standard model.
Despite the argument that the empirical relevance of the cost channel is
small and that there is an apparent tension between observed inﬂation rate
dynamics and theoretical models based on optimizing behavior, we study
optimal monetary policy in a new Keynesian model that includes a cost channel
for monetary disturbances and the lagged inﬂation rate. Thus, we derive
interest rate rules for the central bank that implement optimal policy, both
under discretion and commitment, and examine under what conditions the
economy is characterized by a unique and learnable REE.
2M o d e l
The model consists of an IS curve and an AS curve with a cost channel for
monetary disturbances in the spirit of Ravenna and Walsh (2006)
½
xt = Et [xt+1] − α(rt − E∗
t [πt+1])
πt = βE∗
t [πt+1]+γxt + δrt + εt
(2.1)
where the expected inﬂation rate is
E
∗
t [πt+1]=ωπt−1 +( 1− ω)Et [πt+1] (2.2)
and ω ∈ [0,1] is the importance of the lagged inﬂation rate in the expectations
formation process. Moreover, xt is the output gap, rt i st h ei n t e r e s tr a t et h a t
7is controlled by the central bank, πt is the inﬂation rate, and εt is a cost-push
shock. Finally, Et [·] is the mathematical expectation of the variable in focus,
conditioned on the structure of the complete model as well as realized values
of all variables in the model up to and including time t.
Even though there is an endogenous cost channel in the AS curve, we also
incorporate exogenous cost-push shocks into the model to allow for impulses
to the economy. However, εt ≡ 0 would not aﬀect our ﬁndings. Moreover,
even though the current inﬂa t i o nr a t ei si n c l u d e di nt h ea g e n t s ’i n f o r m a t i o n
set, we make use of the lagged inﬂation rate in the expectations formation
process since we would like to examine the properties of the model using a
hybrid speciﬁcation of the new Keynesian Phillips curve (see Galí and Gertler,
1999, for a derivation of this curve).
3 Optimal monetary policy
The model in (2.1)—(2.2) is closed by deriving an interest rate rule for the
central bank that minimizes an objective function that translates the target












where ζ is the ﬂexibility in inﬂation rate targeting that is restricted to ζ ∈ [0,1]
when the properties of the model are examined. As will be clear below, this is
not an important restriction from the point of view of optimal policy-making.
Moreover, since we have neglected from ﬁscal shocks in the IS curve, the welfare
measure in (3.1) coincides with the measure derived in Ravenna and Walsh
(2006). Speciﬁcally, their measure is a second-order approximation of the
representative household’s utility function.








i − λiπi (3.2)












· xi+1 + εi
¶
}
where the constraint in the optimization problem is the economy’s law of
motion in (2.1)—(2.2).1 Thus, the ﬁrst-order conditions when there is discretion
in policy-making are
½






πt :2 πt − λt + β (β + δ)ωλt+1 =0 (3.3)
However, instead of optimizing the objective function in each time period,
the central bank can do better by solving for the ﬁrst-order conditions that
1 In the Technical Appendix, derivations of several of the equations in this paper can be
found, including the constraint in (3.2).
8support a policy that is optimal over time. In this case, the Lagrangian has
the following ﬁrst-order conditions
½
xt : δ






πt :( β + δ)(1− ω)λt−1 +2 βπt − βλt + β
2 (β + δ)ωλt+1 =0
(3.4)
Notice that the conditions in (3.3) are causing a time-inconsistency problem
in policy-making since they are not consistent with the conditions in (3.4).
A simple way to solve this problem, at least theoretically, is to assume that
the former conditions do not hold. This approach has been coined a ‘timeless
perspective’ by Woodford (1999) since it assumes that the optimal policy has
been implemented long time enough that agents in the economy believe that
the central bank is committed to the policy.
Thus, when a commitment mechanism is not available in policy-making,





αβ (β + δ)ζω
αγ − δ
· xt+1 (3.5)






α(β + δ)ζ (1 − ω)
(αγ − δ)β




αβ (β + δ)ζω
αγ − δ
· xt+1
Starting with the condition in (3.5), the lead output gap is included in the
condition since the central bank partly can control the expected inﬂation rate,
a n dt h i si sb e c a u s et h el a g g e di n ﬂation rate is included in the expectations
formation process. Notice that this term also vanish when ω =0 .C o n t i n u i n g
with the condition in (3.6), terms for the lagged inﬂation rate and output gap
are now added. The second term is typical in conditions when a commitment
mechanism is available, whereas the ﬁrst term is due to the presence of the
cost channel. Notice that this term also vanish when δ =0 .
As already stated in the literature, there is no unique way in which
a condition for optimal policy can be implemented by the central bank
as an interest rate rule. Evans and Honkapohja (2003a) review diﬀerent
implementations of optimal policy in a new Keynesian model from the point
of view of least squares learnability of a unique REE. Our aim is to examine
optimal policy from the same perspective as them, but for a model with a
cost channel and inﬂation rate expectations that partly are backward-looking.
Thus, we derive expectations-based rules since they have nice properties in
more typical new Keynesian models (see Evans and Honkapohja, 2003a—c,
2006).
The reason that expectations-based rules give rise to a REE that is
stable under learning, as opposed to fundamentals-based rules, is that they
are designed for this task. For the sake of the argument, assume that the
economy is in the neighborhood of a REE, and that the central bank is using
a fundamentals-based rule in policy-making. Unfortunately, since the rule
9is derived under the assumption that the economy is in a REE, there is no
mechanism that forces agents to correct their beliefs regarding the economy’s
law of motion. The economy will, therefore, not converge to the REE since it
is not stable under learning.
When it comes to expectations-based rules, they are also optimal policy
rules, but do not assume that agents have rational expectations. Instead,
when the central bank is using such a rule in policy-making, the interest rate
is directly inﬂuenced by agents’ private expectations that may not be rational,
meaning that there is now a mechanism that is able to correct their beliefs
regarding the economy’s law of motion. In other words, the economy is forced
to converge to the REE since it is stable under learning.
Thus, the key assumption when deriving expectations-based rules is to take
agents’ expectations as given and not imposing rational expectations, meaning
that we have the following optimal interest rate rule
rt = const. + κ0xt−1 + κ1xt + κ2x
e
t+1 + κ3πt−1 + κ4π
e
t+1 (3.7)
where e in the superscript denotes expectations that may not be rational.


















whereas under commitment, we have that
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
κ0 = −
α(β+δ)ζ(1−ω)
(αγ−δ)2β κ3 = 1
αγ−δ ·
³















The two diﬀe r e n c e sb e t w e e nt h er u l e sa r et h a tat e r mf o rt h el a g g e do u t p u t
gap is included when a commitment mechanism is available, and that the term
for the lagged inﬂa t i o nr a t ei sl a r g e ru n d e rc o m m i t m e n t .
4 A determinate and E-stable REE?
The complete model in matrix form, both under discretion and commitment
in policy-making, is2
Γ · yt = Θ · y
e








2 We neglect from a constant in the expression since it does not aﬀect our ﬁndings.
10Θ =
∙
1 − ακ2 α(1 − ω − κ4)





−ακ0 α(ω − κ3)








Recall that κ0 =0when there is discretion in policy-making.
To be able to determine whether the complete model has a determinate
REE, a ﬁrst step is to rewrite the model into ﬁrst-order form, and, then, to
compare the number of predetermined variables with the number of eigenvalues
of a certain matrix that are outside the unit circle (see Blanchard and Kahn,
1980). Speciﬁcally, we make use of the following variable vector when rewriting























where Λ2 is the second column in matrix Λ, because the complete model in
matrix form is now
Γd · yd,t = Θd · y
e
d,t+1 (4.9)
Thus, since there is one variable in (4.6) that is predetermined, πL
t ,e x a c t l y
one eigenvalue of the matrix Γ
−1
d ·Θd must be outside the unit circle to have a
determinate REE. However, if more than one eigenvalue are outside the unit
circle, we have an indeterminate REE, and if all eigenvalues are inside the unit
circle, there is no stable REE.
To have a REE that is stable under learning, the parameter values in
the agents’ perceived law of motion of the economy have to converge to the
economy’s actual law of motion, and it is shown in McCallum (2007) that
for a broad class of linear rational expectations models, which includes the
model in this paper, a determinate solution is E-stable when the dating of
expectations is time t. Consequently, since E-stability is closely related to
least squares learning, all determinacy regions found below are also regions
for least squares learnability of the unique REE (see Evans and Honkapohja,
2001, for an introduction to this learning literature).
However, deriving analytical conditions for determinacy is not meaningful
since these expressions would be too large and cumbersome to interpret.
11Therefore, we illustrate our ﬁndings numerically3 using the following calibrated
values of the structural parameters: α = 1
2 since it has been estimated to be 1
2.04
and 1
1.86 for the US economy (see Levin et al, 2005, and Lubik and Schorfheide,
2004, respectively); β =0 .99; γ =0 .072 s i n c et h i si sa ne s t i m a t ef o rt h eU S
economy under the assumption of unit intertemporal substitution elasticities
in consumption and labor supply (see Chowdhury et al, 2006, for details); and
δ =0 .03 since this is an estimate for the US economy (see Chowdhury et al,
2006).
See Figure 1 for regions in the (ω,ζ)-space that give rise to a determinate
and E-stable REE, an indeterminate REE and no stable REE.
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Figure 1. Region for a determinate REE that is stable under learning (see
light area) and regions for an indeterminate REE (see dark area) and no stable
REE (see white area)
There is a determinate REE that is stable under learning when inﬂation rate
targeting is not too ﬂexible, except when the lagged inﬂation rate is very
important in the expectations formation process. In this case, there is always
a unique and learnable REE. Further on, since the welfare measure can be
viewed as a second-order approximation of the representative household’s
utility function, there is an optimal degree of ﬂexibility in inﬂation rate
targeting. Woodford (2003) has looked into this matter in a model that is
similar to the present model, and he found that almost strict inﬂation rate
targeting to be optimal (ζ =0 .048). This is also within the limit to have
3 MATLAB routines for this purpose are available on request from the author.
12a determinate REE that is stable under learning, except when the lagged
inﬂation rate has almost no importance in inﬂation rate expectations.
If we decrease the size of the cost channel to δ =0 .015, the region for a
determinate REE that is stable under learning is much larger. The shape of
the region in the (ω,ζ)- s p a c ei st h es a m ea sw h e nδ =0 .03,b u ti n ﬂation rate
targeting can be much more ﬂexible. See Figure 2 for this case.
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Figure 2. Region for a determinate REE that is stable under learning (see
light area) and region for an indeterminate REE (see dark area)
In fact, when there is no cost channel in the model, there are no restrictions in
the (ω,ζ)-space4 to have a determinate and E-stable REE. We already know
that this is true when backward-looking expectations have no role in inﬂation
rate expectations (see Evans and Honkapohja, 2003b), but it is now clear that
this result also holds irrespective of the importance of the lagged inﬂation rate
in the expectations formation process.
However, if the size of the cost channel is twice as large as in the baseline
case, δ =0 .06, the behavior of the economy is dramatically diﬀerent. In this
case, there is no longer any region in the (ω,ζ)-space for a determinate REE
that is stable under learning. Instead, if we restrict our attention to almost
strict inﬂation rate targeting, there is a multiplicity of stable REE, whereas a
more ﬂexible targeting in combination with a large weight given to the lagged
inﬂation rate in the expectations formation process, there is no stable REE at
a l l .S e eF i g u r e3f o rt h i sc a s e .
4 Recall that ζ ∈ [0,1].T h u s ,w h e nζ =1 , the central bank puts equal weights on the
inﬂation rate and the output gap when maximizing welfare.
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Figure 3. Regions for an indeterminate REE (see dark area) and no stable
REE (see white area)
The reason for this ﬁn d i n gi st h a tal a r g ec o s tc h a n n e lh a sap e r v e r s ee ﬀect on
the parameters in the optimal policy rule. Speciﬁcally, when
δ>α γ (4.10)
the central bank will decrease the interest rate when the lagged and expected
inﬂation rates increase, meaning that monetary policy is stimulating the
economy. It is clear that in the absence of a cost channel, this perverse situation
can never arise, whereas it is more likely to happen when the cost channel is
larger.
U n d e rc o m m i t m e n ti np o l i c y - m a k i n g ,w em a k eu s eo ft h ef o l l o w i n gv a r i a b l e




t ≡ xt−1 πL
t ≡ πt−1
¤0 (4.11)























where Λ1 and Λ2 are the ﬁrst and second columns in matrix Λ, respectively,
because the complete model in matrix form is now
Γc · yc,t = Θc · y
e
c,t+1 (4.14)
Thus, since there are two variables in (4.11) that are predetermined, xL
t and
πL
t , exactly two eigenvalues of the matrix Γ−1
c · Θc must be outside the unit
circle to have a determinate REE. However, if more than two eigenvalues are
outside the unit circle, we have an indeterminate REE, and if less than two
eigenvalues are outside the unit circle, there is no stable REE.
Turning to our ﬁndings, there are no restrictions in the (ω,ζ)-space to
have a determinate REE that is stable under learning, and this result holds
for the same sizes of the cost channel as we examined above when there was
no commitment mechanism in policy-making (i.e., δ =0 , δ =0 .015, δ =0 .03
and δ =0 .06). In fact, after investigating several parameter settings, including
unrealistic settings, our conjecture is that we always have a unique and least
squares learnable REE.
5 Misapprehensions in policy-making
What happens if the central bank is unaware of the cost channel for monetary
disturbances, and, therefore, believe that δ =0in the interest rate rule?
Moreover, what happens if the central bank neglects the fact that inﬂation
rate expectations partly are backward-looking, and, therefore, believe that
ω =0in the interest rate rule?
Starting with the belief that δ =0when, in fact, δ =0 .03, the shape of the
region in the (ω,ζ)-space for a determinate and E-stable REE is unaﬀected
when there is discretion in policy-making, but inﬂation rate targeting can now
be more ﬂexible.5 It might, therefore, be tempting to believe that the central
bank should not care about the cost channel when setting the interest rate.
However, one must not forget that monetary policy no longer is optimal due
to the misapprehension of the size of the cost channel. When it comes to
commitment in policy-making, there are no restrictions in the (ω,ζ)-space to
have a determinate REE that is stable under learning.
Continuing with the belief that ω =0when, in fact, ω>0,t h e
maximum ﬂexibility in inﬂation rate targeting is unaﬀected by the importance
of the lagged inﬂation rate to have a determinate and E-stable REE when
there is discretion in policy-making, and the region in the (ω,ζ)-space for a
determinate and E-stable REE is now smaller. When it comes to commitment
5 To save space, we do not show any ﬁg u r e si nt h i ss e c t i o n .H o w e v e r ,i nt h eA p p e n d i x ,
we show lots of ﬁgures for diﬀerent combinations of misapprehensions in policy-making and
sizes of the cost channel, both under discretion and commitment.
15in policy-making, there are almost no restrictions in the (ω,ζ)-space to have a
determinate REE that is stable under learning.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In recent years, there has been an increased interest for the cost channel for
monetary disturbances, which also is true for a hybrid speciﬁcation of the
new Keynesian Phillips curve. What we have done in this paper is to show
that expectations-based rules, originally proposed by Evans and Honkapohja
(2003a)—(2006), still have desirable properties in a new Keynesian model with
the aforementioned features. In fact, under commitment in policy-making, it
seems to be the case that there are no restrictions in the (ω,ζ)-space to have
a determinate REE that is stable under learning, whereas under discretion,
inﬂation rate targeting cannot be too ﬂexible.
Thus, if we summarize our ﬁndings in one sentence: it is not only the case
that optimal policy under commitment is superior to a discretionary policy
from a welfare perspective, there is also no guarantee that the latter policy
will secure an REE that is unique and least squares learnable, which is the
case when there is commitment in policy-making.
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18Technical Appendix
Constraint in the Lagrangian
Substitute the expected inﬂation rate in (2.2) into the IS and AS curves in
(2.1)
½
xt = Et [xt+1] − α(rt − (ωπt−1 +( 1− ω)Et [πt+1]))
πt = β (ωπt−1 +( 1− ω)Et [πt+1]) + γxt + δrt + εt
or
½
xt = Et [xt+1] − αrt + αωπt−1 + α(1 − ω)Et [πt+1]
πt = βωπt−1 + β (1 − ω)Et [πt+1]+γxt + δrt + εt
(A.1)




α · Et [xt+1]+ωπt−1 +( 1− ω)Et [πt+1] − 1
α · xt
πt = βωπt−1 + β (1 − ω)Et [πt+1]+γxt + δrt + εt






















First-order condition when discretion in policy-making































αβ (β + δ)ζω
αγ − δ
· xt+1 (3.5)
19First-order condition when commitment in policy-making
















Substitute this equation into the second equation in (3.4)
(β + δ)(1− ω)λt−1 +2 βπt − βλt +
β



























(αγ − δ)(β + δ)(1− ω)
(αγ +( β + δ)δω − δ)β
· λt−1 − (A.3)
2αβ (β + δ)ζω
αγ +( β + δ)δω − δ
· xt+1 +
2(αγ − δ)
αγ +( β + δ)δω − δ
· πt
(A.2) and (A.3) are two equations in λt and λt−1. Solve these equations for
these variables, but be aware that λt is λt−1 one time period forward in time
½
λt = −Aλt−1 − Bxt
λt = Cλt−1 − Dxt+1 + Eπt
(A.4)
or











































· πt − Bxt
or










Backward this equation one time period


















(αγ − δ)(β + δ)(1− ω)
(αγ +( β + δ)δω − δ)β
·







2αβ (β + δ)ζω






αγ +( β + δ)δω − δ
2(αγ − δ)
· xt +
2αβ (β + δ)ζω
αγ +( β + δ)δω − δ
·








α(β + δ)ζ (1 − ω)
(αγ − δ)β




αβ (β + δ)ζω
αγ − δ
· xt+1
Derive the interest rate rule when discretion in policy-making without
imposing rational expectations
Substitute the ﬁrst equation in (A.1) into the second equation in (A.1), but
do not assume rational expectations











+ δrt + εt
or





t+1 − (αγ − δ)rt + εt












































rt = const. + κ0xt−1 + κ1xt + κ2x
e
t+1 + κ3πt−1 + κ4π
e
t+1 (3.7)
Derive the interest rate rule when commitment in policy-making without
imposing rational expectations





















t+1 − (αγ − δ)rt + εt
or
rt = −




































Complete model under both discretion and commitment in policy-making
Substitute the interest rate rule in (3.7) into the equations in (A.1), do not







κ0xt−1 + κ1xt + κ2xe




αωπt−1 + α(1 − ω)πe
t+1




κ0xt−1 + κ1xt + κ2xe







(1 + ακ1)xt =( 1− ακ2)xe
t+1 + α(1 − ω − κ4)πe
t+1−
ακ0xt−1 + α(ω − κ3)πt−1
−(γ + δκ1)xt + πt = δκ2xe
t+1 +( β (1 − ω)+δκ4)πe
t+1+





Figure  Type of  Size of  Aware of the  Aware of lagged 
  optimal policy  cost channel  cost channel?  inflation rate? 
        
1 Discretion  Normal  Yes  Yes 
A.1 Discretion  Normal  No  Yes 
A.2 Discretion  Normal  Yes  No 
A.3 Discretion  Normal  No  No 
        
2 Discretion  Small  Yes  Yes 
No figure
1 Discretion  Small  No  Yes 
A.4 Discretion  Small  Yes  No 
No figure  Discretion  Small  No  No 
        
3 Discretion  Large  Yes  Yes 
A.5 Discretion  Large  No  Yes 
A.6 Discretion  Large  Yes  No 
A.7 Discretion  Large  No  No 
        
No figure  Discretion  No channel  -  Yes 
No figure  Discretion  No channel  -  No 
        
No figure  Commitment  Normal  Yes  Yes 
No figure  Commitment  Normal  No  Yes 
A.8 Commitment  Normal  Yes  No 
A.9 Commitment  Normal  No  No 
        
No figure  Commitment  Small  Yes  Yes 
No figure  Commitment  Small  No  Yes 
A.10 Commitment  Small  Yes  No 
No figure  Commitment  Small  No  No 
        
No figure  Commitment  Large  Yes  Yes 
A.11 Commitment  Large  No  Yes 
A.12 Commitment  Large  Yes  No 
A.13 Commitment  Large  No  No 
        
No figure  Commitment  No channel  -  Yes 
No figure  Commitment  No channel  -  No 
 
                                                 
1 When there is always a determinate REE that is stable under learning, we do not show any figure.  
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Figure 1. Region for a determinate REE that is stable under learning (see light area) and 
regions for an indeterminate REE (see dark area) and no stable REE (see white area) 
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Figure A.1. Region for a determinate REE that is stable under learning (see light area) 
and regions for an indeterminate REE (see dark area) and no stable REE (see white area)  
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Figure A.2. Region for a determinate REE that is stable under learning (see light area) 
and regions for an indeterminate REE (see dark area) and no stable REE (see white area) 
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Figure A.3. Region for a determinate REE that is stable under learning (see light area) 
and regions for an indeterminate REE (see dark area) and no stable REE (see white area)  
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Figure 2. Region for a determinate REE that is stable under learning (see light area) and 
region for an indeterminate REE (see dark area) 
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Figure A.4. Region for a determinate REE that is stable under learning (see light area) 
and regions for an indeterminate REE (see dark area) and no stable REE (see white area)  
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Figure 3. Regions for an indeterminate REE (see dark area) and no stable REE (see white 
area) 
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Figure A.5. Region for a determinate REE that is stable under learning (see light area) 
and regions for an indeterminate REE (see dark area) and no stable REE (see white area)  
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Figure A.6. Regions for an indeterminate REE (see dark area) and no stable REE (see 
white area) 
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Figure A.7. Region for a determinate REE that is stable under learning (see light area) 
and regions for an indeterminate REE (see dark area) and no stable REE (see white area)  
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Figure A.8. Region for a determinate REE that is stable under learning (see light area) 
and region when there is no stable REE (see white area) 
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Figure A.9. Region for a determinate REE that is stable under learning (see light area) 
and region when there is no stable REE (see white area)  
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Figure A.10. Region for a determinate REE that is stable under learning (see light area) 
and region when there is no stable REE (see white area) 
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Figure A.11. Region for a determinate REE that is stable under learning (see light area) 
and region for an indeterminate REE (see dark area)  
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Figure A.12. Region for a determinate REE that is stable under learning (see light area) 
and region when there is no stable REE (see white area) 
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Figure A.13. Region for a determinate REE that is stable under learning (see light area) 
and regions for an indeterminate REE (see dark area) and no stable REE (see white area)  
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